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Abstract
In this article the author examines the relationship between paternalism and childhood obesity. In
particular he examines the risks of paternalistic intervention in order to prevent or curtail the occurrence of obesity among young children.
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The preventive function of government . . . is far more liable to be abused, to the prejudice of liberty, than
the punitory [sic] function; for there is hardly any part of the legitimate exercise of freedom of action and
a human being which would not admit of being represented, and fairly, too, as increasing the facilities for
some form or other of delinquency. (Mill, 1978, p. 95)

besity describes an abnormally high fat
accumulation that impairs health. It is crudely
measured by a body mass index (BMI) of greater
than 30 kg/sq meters. That is to say, if a person’s weight in kilograms
divided by height in meters equals 30 or more, that person may be
considered medically obese. The BMI for being overweight is 25kg/
sq meters.
Obesity now ranks among the highest of concerns by the
World Health Organization (WHO) and not only in countries of
affluence; the figures of obesity worldwide have doubled since 1980
and the problem can now commonly be found in low-and middle-
income countries, especially in urban centers. The figures that map
the steady rise of obesity across continents are staggering: between
20-24% of adults in the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand,
Iceland and Luxembourg are officially obese. In Mexico and the
United States the figure now tops 30% (OECD 2010).1
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The correlation between poverty and obesity should not
surprise us: Poorer people are generally less well educated than are
those who have money to spend on quality private education or
housing in a district that provides quality public education and
have less access to reliable health information and to preventative
health care. Further, unable to afford more expensive and healthy
food, poorer people generally purchase processed foods with high
concentrations of fat, salt, and sugars. Conversely, wealthier and
better educated people are more likely to carefully monitor their
caloric intake, to exercise regularly, and to belong to social networks that do the same. They are able to sustain healthy eating
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habits by having on average more leisure time that allows them to
invest in healthy food selection and to teach their children about
thoughtful meal preparation, including using cookbooks or recipe
websites by those advocating low-calorie food and reading popular
authors, such as Eric Schlosser and Michael Pollan, who investigate
the food industry.
The widespread availability of cheap and unhealthy food is no
accident; rather, policy decisions facilitate its mass distribution and
availability. For example, the American government invests
billions in subsidies so that farmers grow corn; processed food
made from corn starch supplies the basis for all kinds of inexpensive and unhealthy foods. This includes food that routinely appears
in American school lunch programs. Corporations, too, have a
vested interest in targeting younger and younger consumers and
invest billions both in advertising and product placement. The
result is that millions are at greater risk of diabetes, cardiovascular
diseases, and cancer. The health risks associated with obesity
accrue not only for individuals but also for society, which must
shoulder the exorbitant costs associated both with missed workdays because of obesity-related illnesses as well as with health care
for those whose obesity is causally related to a range of poor health
outcomes. For WHO as well as a number of governments throughout Europe and North America, the frontline of this battle against
obesity is its occurrence in young children.
Taking all the research together, it is not difficult to understand why the spread of obesity for many signals a need for more
intervention from governments, particularly to protect the welfare
of children. Efforts to address the epidemic that is child obesity
take many forms. Many of these aim simply to supply and distribute reliable health information; they seek to construct better choice
sets in order to facilitate the conditions and opportunities necessary for sustaining well-being. These efforts aim to steer, direct,
guide, and enable people to choose something better for themselves (see Thaler & Sustein, 2008). Often these efforts are labelled
as paternalistic. The label is misleading, however. Paternalism does
not merely entail attempts to guide or suggest. Rather, paternalism
entails interference with the liberty of another for the purposes of
promoting some good or preventing some harm, for the sake of the
other person or for that of the person acting paternalistically. In
this article I focus on paternalism so understood, and especially its
relevance to the question of childhood obesity. I map out the basic
contours of paternalism, followed by an analysis in which the
purpose is to assess the appropriateness or inappropriateness of
paternalistic intervention in order to prevent or curtail the
occurrence of obesity among young children.
The moral aim of paternalism is to act on behalf of the
interests of others who presumably lack sufficient information or
the resolve to inform and guide their actions. Such interference can
be justified when people are treated with respect or when compelling reasons for interference override basic liberty claims. Respect
normally begins with the recognition that we must value another’s
capacity for self-determination to the extent that it exists, or could
exist. For example, because many citizens cannot be relied upon to
always exercise their liberty responsibly, states behave paternalistically by imposing traffic laws, subjecting restaurants to periodic
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health inspections, forbidding the possession of certain weapons,
and imposing building safety codes and environmental restrictions. And when parents fail to exercise their duties responsibly,
they too are subject to state interference. In each of these cases, the
justification seems fairly straightforward: Certain overriding
factors—in particular public health and safety—trump the exercise
of personal liberty, and these goods are therefore sufficient to
justify the restriction of liberty.
Young children are therefore a special case. Given their limited
emotional and cognitive development, as well as what Feinberg
(1986) called their “right to an open future,” paternalism is typically
necessary to secure a child’s immediate and future interests. Young
children cannot be assumed to take responsibility for their own
choices or health, let alone to understand their impact. For instance,
elementary-school children may receive information about a
balanced diet from their physical education teachers, yet be bombarded every day with advertisements for junk food and, moreover,
encounter pizza, hot dogs, and hamburgers as the main menu items
in their school cafeteria. Accordingly, most liberals justify paternalism when a child’s well-being appears to be at stake.
Nevertheless, paternalism remains objectionable to many not
only because of the way in which it generally interferes with
individual liberty but also because of how it seems to infantilize us.
As de Marneffe wrote, “In limiting our liberty for our own good, it
seems that the government treats us like children or that it impedes
our development into fully mature adults” (2006, p. 68). Again, this
is because at the heart of paternalism there is interference, interference of a coercive sort, even when it is justified on the basis on
prevention from harm.
Now even strong libertarians hold that it is necessary to
interfere with the liberty of another if the exercise thereof would
have disastrous consequences, or when the exercise of liberty
needlessly incurs harm on others. But while the interference with
another’s liberty is not morally objectionable per se, three things
must be stressed: (a) Coercive interference with the liberty of
others requires strong justification; (b) affixing blame without
regard to context is a losing strategy; (c) interference with the
purpose of preventing harm is particularly subject to abuse—as the
earlier quote from Mill explains.
When we come to the question of childhood obesity, there is
broad consensus that it is unequivocally harmful. Moreover, not a
few believe that parents—many of whom themselves are obese—are
largely responsible for this harm. Accordingly, in many countries
governments are aggressively stepping up their efforts to stamp out
childhood obesity. For example, in 2009 34 states in the United States
passed legislation on a range of issues from physical exercise, to
healthy eating, to access to healthy food (Winterfeld, Shinkle, &
Morandi, 2010). The general motivations clearly are to improve the
health of young people, while the specific policy initiatives are to
advise parents and ensure that there is adequate knowledge about
and better access to a nutritional diet and exercise.
It is not difficult to assess what the harms of obesity are; many
of these have already been mentioned. Nor is it difficult to determine the conditions under which obesity is likely to occur. Be that
as it may, knowing precisely how to balance the liberty interests of
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ordinary citizens against what many feel is a public health concern
is very complex, as is determining the seriousness of obesity
compared to other forms of harm. For example, is the harm caused
by being obese analogous to being denied a blood transfusion or a
decent education? Can it even remotely be compared to harm
involving physical or psychological violence? Even if we dismiss the
false analogies, recognizing that these represent criminal activity
against others, to what other risky behavior will we compare
obesity and will similar interventions be justified? What will such
interventions portend with respect to basic liberties, particularly
those that involve risk? Who will determine whether—let alone
when—there is a crisis? Should intervention to avert harm occur in
the absence of consent? However we answer these questions, the
burdens of proof of harm and neglect for preventative interference
are not trivial.
As I hope these preliminary comments show, the issues before
us are not, as most liberals generally argue, simply about safeguarding the interests of children. Nor are they, as most libertarians
argue, merely about the liberty to do what one pleases without
interference from others so long as the exercise of my freedom does
not trespass against others. Contra the standard liberal argument,
determining what the best interests of any child are is not a simple
affair, even though it is rather easy to claim that a child’s best
interests are paramount. Even so, the well-being of any particular
child will vary in the details from one to the next. This is because
beyond a basic set of conditions such as shelter, adequate nourishment, relational intimacy, and physical safety, well-being is
somewhat context-dependent. Contra the standard libertarian
argument, the exercise of individual liberty is never absolute, and
certainly not when the liberties of others are compromised. The
exercise of any liberty must be checked against the interests of
others. So I think it is a good idea if we push these two competing
conceptions aside and explore the major dilemmas.
As I see it, the first dilemma is how to balance state paternalism against the special privileges and relationships parents have
with and toward their own children. When these conflict, who is to
decide how they should be prioritized? Most parents are positioned
to their children in unique ways. Mothers conceive, give birth, and
raise children, knowing their needs and interests like few others
ever could. Notwithstanding personal shortcomings and errors of
judgment, most parents also unconditionally love their own
children, nourishing them with affection and concern (albeit in a
variety of ways), a gift no child protection or welfare service ever
could satisfactorily supply. Nor could any competency test measure
a parent’s love.
That said, parents do not possess rights to have or raise
children, even if that is how most of us continue to think of it.
Biology does not confer entitlement. Our relationship as parents to
our own children is largely role-dependent, which means that we
are charged with duties to care for our own children, and states
have prerogatives to intervene when there is clear evidence of abuse
or neglect. States, even liberal democratic ones, ascribe to
themselves—legitimately or not—ultimate authority over the lives
of citizens and when parents fail to meet their basic duties to their
children, those adults effectively surrender their privileges. For
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example, child protection services can place abused or neglected
children in foster care. States already possess the trump card.
Yet liberals routinely describe the state as a benevolent
political entity whose infinite wisdom with respect to human affairs
can be trusted to adjudicate between competing interests. But why
should we take this for granted? After all, the state is not a collection of philosopher rulers, tried and tested through rigorous
selection processes in a utopian state in which the family has been
abolished. Rather, the state invariably consists of individuals with
their own disputable interests, and many of these conflict with
other values citizens are entitled to have. Of course, state officials
are believed to possess competences with respect to the charges
they are asked to carry out. Health officials presumably know more
about health, secretaries of finance more about balanced budgets,
and so forth. But agents of the state cannot simply be presumed to
have the best interests of the public at heart. Here I need not indulge
the temptation to say something about corruption. It will suffice to
say that incompetence by state officials often leads to misdiagnosis
and often dramatically worsens, rather than helps, the plight of
those whose well-being is in question. Finally, states do not remain
static from one moment in time to the next. Public attitudes shift
according to circumstance and perceived threat, politicians with
different attitudes and orientations are elected and deposed, and
policies can be quickly turned on their head. So we would be naive
to take a singularly optimistic view of the state, even when the
so-called best interests of the child are the principal concern.
Consider compulsory school attendance laws: These were
instituted with the aim of providing all children equal access and
opportunities. Even so, German parents have been jailed simply for
homeschooling their children, even when there was no evidence of
harm (Spiegler 2003). Liberal states are not immune from behaving
illiberally, regardless of what their stated motives are. (I shall say
more about this shortly.) The point is this: Like parents, liberal states
are quite capable of viewing persons instrumentally, not to mention
exercising indiscriminate power over the lives of vulnerable subjects.
So in saying that children are entitled to equal protection and that
states have moral requirements to supply that protection, we have not
solved the challenge of determining what the nature of the entitlement is, nor what the scope of that requirement is.
This brings me to the second dilemma, namely the formulation of risk and the harms of stigma. This concerns not only who
gets to define risk but whose lives are directly affected by these
one-sided discussions. Labelling children and families as being at
risk often carries moralizing baggage that contributes to the
perceived risk. It is no accident, for instance, that so many children
from poor backgrounds end up in unchallenging classrooms where
their label of being at risk results in their being recipients of
condescending treatment and lowered expectations. A label often
becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy. Risk does not only go in one
direction, i.e., the direction that the so-called liberal state says it
does. Families also incur risks when subject to arbitrary state
oversight. Minority families in particular are at risk of highly
discriminatory interference by a state that claims to know—
without including the views of others—what is best. Indeed,
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whenever the state decides that it will define what acceptable
behavior is, it exercises power over the lives of others.
Let’s return for a moment to the parents of overweight or
obese children, because the paternalist line of argument often
assumes these children to be victims of bad parenting; this
unarticulated assumption certainly is used to justify state interventions that aim to curtail childhood obesity. But why start with the
parents? Why not begin with the context in which all of us think
and act, namely the broader culture in which we live? For starters,
we have not even begun to address the socially unacceptable
prejudices against overweight people, and until we do, all talk of
intervention by the state with a view to protecting the best interests
of children will remain one-sided.
Are the risks associated with childhood obesity strong enough
to justify state interference in the lives of families? Is our concern
about that analogous to concerns over sexual abuse, for instance? If it
is, it remains a curious fact in Western societies that it is socially
acceptable to openly ridicule and humiliate overweight persons with
impunity. Indeed, unlike most other kinds of health risks, obesity is a
condition that is already subject to social stigma. (For an historical
overview of stigma attached to fatness in American public life, see
Farrell, 2011). Such stigmas merely compound the difficulty many
people already experience. If those who are overweight don’t first
begin to loathe themselves, ridicule from others quickly turns to
disgust and hatred, and these too often turn to violence. Children are
especially vulnerable here. Overweight children are far more likely to
be harassed, teased, bullied, and terrorized for no reason other than
the shape of their bodies. And these effects of the prejudice are no
different from those for people who suffer on account of their sexual
orientation or the color of their skin.
Or consider the labor market, where overweight people are far
more likely to be discriminated against than those who are
considered average-sized or thin. The issue is serious enough that
cities like Washington and San Francisco have passed legislation
forbidding weight-based forms of discrimination that are every bit
as serious as other forms of discrimination. It seems to me that
these facts highlight another dimension to the problem that
frequently goes unmentioned, namely that the attitudes and
prejudices of the public—and here I do not hesitate to include
higher educated people and the medical establishment—continue
to countenance the public shaming and stigmatization of overweight people. In short, the prejudice against overweight people is
widespread and troubling.
If I am right, then it is no thought experiment to imagine that
interventions and competency tests (not unlike those wishing to
adopt must meet; see LaFollette, 1980) for parents will proceed in
much the same way that other kinds of paternalistic interventions
do, targeting the poor generally and specific ethnic minorities in
particular. Inasmuch as strong correlations between ethnic
minority status, poverty, and obesity continue to persist, this
outcome is not far-fetched. There is perhaps no easier way to
quickly justify public alarm and subsequent state intervention than
by stigmatizing some attribute of society’s weaker members. The
advent of the following prejudice requires little imagination:
Having failed to satisfy some ideal—in this case, good health—that
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more privileged members of society more easily maintain, poor
parents cannot be relied upon to make responsible decisions for
themselves or for their children.
Let’s come back to paternalism. As we have seen, paternalism
involves interference with the liberty of others with the aim of
promoting some good, and this commonly occurs during
moments of perceived harm. But before there is harm there is risk
of harm. There is risk both to one’s present and to one’s future
health states, as well as risks to one’s general state of well-being.
Accordingly, public health officials would like to see more done by
the state to prevent harm from occurring in the first place. But
attempts to prevent harm also entail risk, and those with medical
degrees are not immune from criticism. Within my lifetime, and in
the sincere belief that they were serving the public interest,
so-called liberal states and their medical experts have sanctioned
the infection of Black men with syphilis and the denial of treatment
long after penicillin was discovered for the purposes of accurately
recording their symptoms; they have smiled upon the eugenic
sterilization of couples deemed unfit to bear children on the belief
that the sterilization of the retarded or physically disabled would
reduce suffering; they have diagnosed homosexuals as having a
psychiatric illness on the belief that another’s sexual orientation
can be a condition in need of a cure; they have sanctioned the
banning of children with disabilities from school on the belief that
to do so would be a waste of public expenditure and a detriment to
the learning opportunities of so-called normal children.
It is well-known that widespread abuses of power—in particular by the medical establishment—led to an entire restructuring of
laws and procedures (including the requirement of informed
consent) that were put in place precisely to protect the innocent from
paternalism run amok. The point is this: The coercive use of power is
always justified as a prevention of risk by those wielding said power,
be those risks to the state, to others, or to oneself. Yet when risk is
defined unilaterally by people with tremendous power, other risks
are incurred: risks to privacy, risks to family intimacy, risks to free
choices over an individual’s own leisure time, etc. We might remember the words of Mill: “Wherever there is an ascendant class, a large
portion of the morality of the country emanates from its class
interests and its feelings of class superiority,” (1987, p. 6). We should
be extremely wary of unilateral attempts by the state—even so-called
liberal democratic states—to define the parameters of a child’s best
interest and through policy and interventionist schemes to impose
these on an unsuspecting public. The narrower the definition of best
interest is, the more wary the public should be.
Clearly, if the state is to take a more proactive role in interference with parental liberty, at a minimum some account is needed
concerning what desirable preferences and behaviors are. Efforts to
reduce risk entail drawing boundaries, and boundaries in ethics
assume some conception of what is good or preferable. Yet when
states draw boundaries and apply them to others in the form of
laws, they restrict liberty by defining permissible risk. (I am not
referring to the liberty of corporations or other political entities
but to individual liberty.)
We might begin by offering an account of behaviors that
should be forbidden, those that clearly violate basic freedoms and
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welfare. Legal courts normally begin by addressing instances of
abuse or neglect, but even with broad definitions in place and clear
examples (e.g., sexual abuse) to illustrate what is impermissible,
things quickly become very fuzzy. Interferences with parental
liberty in cases involving obesity, even when it allegedly entails
imminent harm, fall into this category. After all, cases of child
obesity are not morally different from many other cases involving
health risk. Therefore, to argue that the state must interfere with
parental liberty in cases involving obesity begs a number of
questions concerning why it is not also necessary to restrict other
similarly risky behaviors.
But suppose that we were able to agree on some areas of risk
(and this is easier said than done). What constitutes a risk? In its
broadest sense, risk occurs the moment there is life: being born
places us at risk; the air we breathe places us at risk; stepping onto
trains or into automobiles places us at risk; eating food sprayed
with pesticides places us at risk; climbing trees places us at risk;
riding bicycles to work places us at risk; drinking water from a
stream places us at risk; being in relationships places us at risk. In
short, life is defined by risk, though we generally overestimate risk
regarding things less familiar to us and underestimate risk where
our own habits or behaviors are concerned.
So what does it mean to say that the state is entitled to safeguard the developmental interests of children, and what are the
limits to preventative state intervention? How far should we go in
the prevention-of-obesity risk? If there are genetic causes to weight
analogous to genetic causes of height, should we begin with genetic
screening? Should the state tell certain couples that they may not
have children? Conversely, should couples be permitted to abort
knowing there is a probability of inheriting a “fat gene”? Shall we
dictate which snacks children are permitted to eat? However much
we may lament less-than-optimal parenting habits or outcomes,
assessing parental competence with respect to obesity without
analogous supervision in hundreds of other less-than-optimal
activities is question begging.
Free and plural societies must permit a wide range of lifestyle
choices, even when some of these are probably not desirable in any
objective sense given the known risk factors. Consider the vast
number of parents who are divorced,2 who smoke, whose children
play outside without sunscreen, whose children watch several
hours of television a day, whose children attend conservative
religious schools, whose children play contact sports. In each of
these examples, there are known risks: of emotional distress from
divorce, of cancer from smoking or sunbathing, of attention deficit
from chronic television watching, of indoctrination from dogmatic
teaching, of serious injury and death from contact sports. And lest I
devote too much attention to supposedly harmful activities,
consider the risks involved with activities most consider beneficial,
such as fitness and dieting, or the ambitious pursuit of a successful
career! Perhaps there are those who would respond by saying, “Let’s
regulate all of these activities, too!” OK. But then do we not see
Orwell’s specter rising?
In urging caution and restraint, I have not argued for uncontrolled liberty, nor have I neglected the welfare of the child. I have
argued that interventions that aim to prevent harm circumscribe risk
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too narrowly without considering other risks that arise when
paternalistic governments intervene. Because there are legitimate
concerns about the integrity of the family, the use of coercive power, a
respect for people, and the pluralism in free and democratic societies,
interference with ordinary liberties, including those involving risk,
must be strongly justified. Further, given the range of choices all of us
make that have less-than-optimal outcomes, I have also suggested
that censuring parents for obesity begs a number of questions
concerning tolerable levels of risk. Let me close with two more
concerns: The first is practical and the second is procedural.
First, we can all agree that paternalist state intervention in
principle is guided by some version of the harm principle. But we
should also remember that poorer families on average are more
likely to purchase cheaper—hence often less healthy—food for
themselves and their children. Little surprise, then, that obesity is
most widespread among poorer groups. Efforts to improve
parenting skills in themselves can do a lot of good, but proposals
that aim to prevent obesity by calling parental competence into
question put the responsibility on the wrong actors.
Rather than stigmatizing and penalizing parents—which is
precisely the effect competency tests will have—why are there so
few restrictions on what advertisers can do? Why are corporations
that produce unhealthy food not restricted: from misleading the
public with language like pure and natural on their factory-made
products; from targeting young people with their advertising,
particularly when the products have little if any nutritional value;
from coaxing families with young children into frequenting their
establishments by offering free toys, coupons, and playgrounds that
make it more attractive to eat there; and finally, from allowing
fast-food corporations inside of schools?
States also could do a lot more to structure and facilitate
well-informed and affordable alternatives. For example, a more
productive interventionist approach would be to heavily subsidize
healthy food, making it much cheaper and available to all and,
conversely, to heavily tax unhealthy food. Liberal states have a
much longer history of doing precisely the opposite. Nutritional
information on packaging is now standard practice in Western
countries, and further efforts are underway to force restaurants to
publicize the number of calories in servings of food. But states
could also demand that products with questionable nutritional
value be packaged with warning labels, much like tobacco products
are, or put out of sight from the average consumer, like pornography is. And notice that taking this approach would avoid many of
the pitfalls of paternalism by not directly interfering with the
liberty of ordinary citizens.4
Second, decisions about public health should be deliberated
upon democratically. Of course the state has reasons to promote
safety, good health, education, etc., but for its interference to be
perceived as legitimate by a majority of society’s members, it will
need to make its decisions in as democratic a way as possible,
procuring the consent of the governed—particularly when many
of the so-called offenders are vulnerable to the stigmatization that
both precedes and follows punitive actions imposed by the state.3
As I have already shown, interventions in liberal democratic
societies are often decidedly harmful, even when the aim is to
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prevent harm. Average-sized or thin people should not unilaterally make decisions on health in the absence of overweight people
any more than the able-bodied should define normal functioning
in the absence of people with disabilities, or men or heterosexuals
should define equal treatment in the absence of women or gays
and lesbians. When this happens, the conversation is one-sided
and the outcomes are morally suspect. How decisions are made is
every bit as important as which decisions are made. Failure to
take these democratic procedures into account undermines the
state’s legitimacy and surely guarantees abiding resentment from
those accused of parental incompetence. If that is the outcome,
we should expect state interventions that aim to prevent obesity
to fail.
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Notes
1. Different sources report slightly different figures but these
represent reliable and conservative estimates.
2. Divorce per se may leave few scars on children’s lives; much
depends on how old the child is at the time of the divorce, how the
couple handles the conflict, and the continuity of parental involvement after the separation. The point is not that the risk factors
associated with divorce are as certain or as automatic as, say,
smoking, but rather that an enormous literature substantiates my
claim that divorce brings a variety of risks.
3. This is precisely the worry that one researcher found with
respect to a Dutch policy that aims to improve parenting. See
Atze H. M. Van den Bos. (2010). De Overheid Achter de Voordeur:
waar ligt de grens? Opvoedproblemen binnen de Amsterdamse
Achter de Voordeur aanpak [The government behind the front
door: where does the boundary lie? Childrearing problems with
the Amsterdam-based Behind the Frontdoor approach].
(Unpublished master’s thesis). University of Amsterdam,
Netherlands.
4. One recent European study found that there is widespread
public support for three initiatives: (1) providing parents with
more information, (2) requiring more activity in schools, and (3)
restricting advertising. Notwithstanding isolated experiments
that tax high-fat-content food (e.g., Denmark), public support
remains very low. See Suggs & McIntyre (2011).
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